Electronic Surveillance, Computers, and the Fourth Amendment - The New Telecommunications Environment Calls for Reexamination of Doctrine by Landever, Arthur R.
Cleveland State University 
EngagedScholarship@CSU 
Law Faculty Articles and Essays Faculty Scholarship 
Winter 1984 
Electronic Surveillance, Computers, and the Fourth Amendment - 
The New Telecommunications Environment Calls for 
Reexamination of Doctrine 
Arthur R. Landever 
Cleveland State University, a.landever@csuohio.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_articles 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
Original Citation 
Arthur R. Landever, Electronic Surveillance, Computers, and the Fourth Amendment - The New 
Telecommunications Environment Calls for Reexamination of Doctrine, 15 University of Toledo Law 
Review 597 (1984). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Articles and Essays by an authorized administrator of 
EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact research.services@law.csuohio.edu. 
Citation: 15 U. Tol. L. Rev. 597 1983-1984 
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Wed Mar 13 19:02:46 2013
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
   https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?  
   &operation=go&searchType=0   
   &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0042-0190
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, COMPUTERS, AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT - THE NEW
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ENVIRONMENT CALLS FOR
REEXAMINATION OF DOCTRINEt
Arthur R. Landever*
We are in the midst of a revolution in information collection and
telecommunications. Computer networking, the unification of the va-
rious telecommunications systems, the establishment of central data
banks, and government tracking and profiling of vast numbers of
Americans present momentous challenges for our constitutional sys-
tem. Increasingly, in our evolving culture, an individual enters the
public setting in order to conduct his personal life. Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine respecting electronic surveillance, as well as Supreme
Court notions of "free choice" and "assumption of risk" must come
to grips with this new reality. In the main, the author urges judicial
intervention, as the basic mechanism for establishing limits and
controls.
Any sound that Winston made, above the level of a very low
whisper, would be picked up by it ... there was of course no
way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given
moment ... you had to live-did live, from habit that became
instinct-in (sic) the assumption that every sound you made
was overheard and, except in the darkness, every moment scru-
tinized. (1984)1
INTRODUCTION
We have not yet entered George Orwell's 1984; and with some
luck and retooling of our legal system, we can avoid that grim
tyranny. Orwell's state was a totalitarian one in which Big Brother
focused a continuous spotlight upon Winston Smith; in contrast, our
t Copyright 1983 by Arthur R. Landever
* Professor of Law, College of Law, Cleveland State University. A.B., J.D., Ph.D.,
New York University. The author did his doctoral dissertation on the constitutional-
ity of electronic surveillance. See A. LANDEVER, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM (N.Y.U. Doct. Dissertation 1969, University Mi-
crofilms, Inc., 1970).
1. G. ORWELL, 1984 at 4 (1949).
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domestic America has an array of laws2 enacted, at least in part, to
protect us from governmental intrusions. Nonetheless, we have more
than enough technology to meet Big Brother's needs.
Indeed, we are in the midst of a revolution in information collec-
tion and telecommunications; and that development poses threats to
our liberty from both governmental and non-governmental forces.
No monolithic government plot here! Rather, the accelerating
change taking place is the product of a number of factors: citizen
demands for greater safety, welfare and convenience; government
concerns about community security, and about economic develop-
ment; vigorous competition for new communication network mar-
kets among several industries-aerospace, computer, television, tele-
phone, recording, copying; other private commercial activity; and
perhaps most important, the progress of science and technology.
The changes being wrought promise to enrich us, but the cost is
steep: a diminishing of our private lives, with vastly increased op-
portunities for government and others to monitor our actions and to
learn more about us than we would wish. We can fashion sound
fourth amendment doctrines to help control governmental action,
only by appreciating our current predicament.
To begin with, surveillance technology is increasingly more so-
phisticated, owing to the development of the transistor, and re-
cently, to the computer. Moreover, supplementing traditional elec-
tronic and visual surveillance devices are tracking systems. (Thus,
the beeper transponder, attached to a moving object, transmits its
signal to a central listening post; the pen register records the tele-
phone numbers dialed from a suspect's telephone; and the closed-
circuit TV camera peers out onto the public streets as security
agents watch monitors from a distance.)
There also has been a dramatic increase in the amount of data
about each of us that our government, and most particularly Uncle
Sam, now accumulates. Doubtless, the Pentagon, Social Security
and the IRS are the biggest collectors; and some of our files are
made accessible to still other agencies. Of course, accessibility has
been made much easier by the burgeoning computer networks. Not
2. Title III, Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20
(1968); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11 (Supp. IV
1980); Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Tax Reform Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1525 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)
(1976); See Soma & Wehmhoefer, A Legal and Technical Assessment of the Effect of
Computers on Privacy, 60 DEN. L.J. 449 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Soma].
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only do these provide the channels for transmission of information
among government agencies; but such networks and subnets, now
numbering in the thousands, also provide a means for information
exchange, the carrying out of financial transactions, and electronic
mailing among private individuals. Of increasing importance are the
special mail networks established by the United States Postal Ser-
vice and MCI Corporation, and the electronic funds transfer bank-
ing networks.
Coupled with the explosive changes in the methods of communi-
cation and data collection is the convergence of communication
modes-data, voice, video, document and photograph facsimile
(copy). These modes are channelled - or are soon to be channelled
- along the same microwave long-distance transmission belts, via
space satellite and earth station; or via laser-produced light waves
and through fiber optic (glass wire) cables. Boundaries separating
the various telecommunications industries have fallen, as companies
from divergent sectors of the economy rush to take part in the new
markets. Furthermore, along with traditional telephone and tele-
graph networks are two-way radio nets (citizen band radio), audio
and visual teleconferencing subnets, and two-way television cable
communications systems.
Such advances in surveillance technology and tracking systems,
data collection and its resultant profiling, networking, and the unifi-
cation of the varied telecommunications systems have momentous
implications. So also does the new culture, in which the ordinary
citizen must increasingly enter into the public setting in order to
carry on his or her personal life.
In framing constitutional doctrines to meet this dramatic, new
telecommunications reality, we ought to be guided by a number of
fundamental principles. First, the core value of the fourth amend-
ment is the ordinary citizen's right to be free from government in-
terference, unless government can justify its actions and set limits
upon that interference. Second, this commitment to individual free-
dom from government must be balanced against the government's
obligation to protect the citizenry. Third, the neutral magistrate
[absent exigency or unusual circumstances] is to be the one balanc-
ing the interest in personal security with that of government need;
and in doing so, he must take account of the new telecommunica-
tions and monitoring reality. Fourth, a free society presupposes an
environment of relaxed citizen association, and broad privacy zones.
Fifth, the concept of "choice" must take account of the new culture
in which a person must come out into the public place and use tele-
communication nets - in order to associate with others, engage in
Winter 19841
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business, and carry out his legal commitments. Sixth, whether we
should be held to have assumed the risk in engaging in particular
activities ought to be dependent upon our social values and our
changing culture. Seventh, where we must submit information for
one purpose to one institution, the submission should ordinarily not
be deemed divulgence to the world. Eighth, given the erosion of the
traditional "object" and "place" supports for privacy zones, new
doctrines must serve as substitute boundary mechanisms.
Given these principles, the author would require demonstrated
justifications for government monitoring, together with limits on the
practice. The object of such a requirement is to pen in government
and thus reduce the risk of excess and abuse, while permitting police
agencies to carry out their important responsibilities. The fourth
amendment gives the role of balancer to the neutral magistrate.
Only where an emergency or other unusual circumstances demon-
strate that judicial involvement is not appropriate, should it be
eliminated. Included in the activities which must be subject to care-
ful restriction are a wide range of monitoring approaches: electronic
wiretapping and bugging, including participant surveillance; visual
surveillance employing mechanical or electronic equipment to peer
into homes or other traditional private places; accessing computer
message or data exchange, by whatever transmission mechanism and
even if there is supposed participant consent; interception of trans-
mission along microwave or fiber optic channel; interception of cable
communication; interception of video and audio teleconferencing;
interception of electronic mail or banking networks; use of a mail
cover; use of a pen register to record telephone numbers being di-
aled; receipt of banking records concerning a citizen's transactions;
use of beeper devices to track movement; and use of closed circuit
TV cameras in public areas.
I.
We turn now to a closer look at the telecommunications and data
collection revolution. That we are in the midst of such a revolution
is clear:
Item:
The intensive effort of the electronics industry to increase the reliabil-
ity and performance of its products while reducing their size and cost
has led to results that hardly anyone would have dared to predict as
[Vol. 15
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recently as 10 years ago.3
Item:
All evidence points to continued rapid development and change in the
telecommunications industry. Technological progress in electronics
and transmissions technology should bring telecommunications costs
down far below today's level."
Item:
In my classes I often hold [in my hand, several microprocessing chips
costing $100] and point out to the students that 25 years ago that
amount of computing power would have cost more than $1 million
and would have occupied several large rooms.'
Item:
It has been estimated that by 1987, six to seven times the present
volume of new information will be produced, however the ability of
computers to automate the information may approach one hundred
times the current capacity.'
Surveillance Devices
7
As a result of technological advances, improved surveillance de-
vices are readily available. Indeed, several are on the market as ordi-
nary electronic "toys." Witness the pocket recorder, the portable TV
camera, the camera with telescopic lens, the citizens-band radio, the
3. Hittinger & Sparks, Micro-electronics - A New Technology Reduces Entire
Electronic Circuits to Tiny Modular Chips, 213 Sci. AM. 56-70 (Nov. 1965), quoted
in A. Landever, Electronic Surveillance & the American Constitutional System 72
(N.Y.U. Doct. Dissertation 1969, University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
1970).
4. G. BROCK, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY: THE DYNAMICS OF MARKET
STRUCTURE 309 (1981).
5. Surveillance Technology: Joint Hearings before the Subcomm. on Constitu-
tional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Special Subcomm. on
Science, Technology and Commerce of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 54 (1975) (statement of Paul Armer, Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in
the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, Calif., referring to classes at the Center) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Surveillance Technology: Joint Hearings].
6. See Soma, supra note 2, at 453-54.
7. See A. Landever, supra note 3, at ch. III, The Devices; STAFF OF SENATE SUB-
COMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY, 1976: POLICY AND IMPLICATIONS: AN ANALYSIS AND
COMPENDIUM OF MATERIALS 27 (Comm. Print 1976) (discussing the characteristics of
current technology); VanDewerker, State of the Art of Electronic Surveillance, re-
printed in Commission Studies, National Commission for the Review of Federal and
State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance 141-215 (1976);
Hamit, No Place to Hide, 1982 YEARBOOK OF SCIENCE AND THE FUTURE 182-196 (Ency-
clopedia Brittanica 1982).
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parabolic mike and directional mike (used by sportscasters to over-
hear conversation on the playing field), and of course, the computer.
All of these devices, as well as others specially designed for gov-
ernment surveillance, are growing more powerful, more reliable,
smaller, lower costing, and longer lasting. For example, a pocket re-
corder can be designed with a voice actuation trigger to substantially
extend useful playing time; the starlight scope, powered by ordinary
flashlight batteries, allows visual surveillance in total darkness; a
voice stress device measures psychological stress of a voice, whether
the sound emanates from telephone, tape, or radio; a harmonica
mike, placed in a telephone set, is activated by dialing the telephone
number and sounding a particular tone; a transmitter "bug" can be
tiny enough to fit into a pill capsule or cufflink; a hair-thin inte-
grated microcircuit can serve as a conductive path from the radio
transmitter device to the listening post; simultaneous tracking of
many vehicles can take place from a single control station; super
secret agencies like the National Security Agency house giant dish
antennas to intercept communication traveling along microwave
across the world.8 Doubtless, laser and fiber optic technology (hair-
thin, glass wire, capable of carrying communications via light wave)
will soon be available to the government eavesdropper-if it is not
already. And the Soviets appear to be experimenting with perhaps
the ultimate in surveillance-mind control and mind jamming by
microwave transmission.9
Computers
The ubiquitous computer now plays a key role in government
monitoring and in telecommunications generally. Not only does it
serve to enhance traditional surveillance methods, it of course stores
and accesses vast amounts of data. Moreover, the computer is the
basic unit in computer networking; and it is also a primary compo-
nent of other modes of telecommunication, such as the telephone
system.
Computers aid directly in electronic surveillance. 10 A computer
hooked up to a listening device can substantially improve the clarity
of recorded conversation by inverting and eliminating unwanted
8. J. BAMFORD, PUZZLE PALACE: REPORT ON AMERICA'S MOST SECRET AGENCY 170-
71 (1982).
9. Soviets Progressing in Mind Control?, Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Nov. 7, 1983,
at 20A, Col. 1.
10. See Hamit, supra note 7, at 193-94.
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parts of the signal-such as background noise and interference-and
amplifying sounds made by speech. Even whispered conversation, at
least theoretically, could be made clear and loud by this method.
Computers also are capable of selecting individual conversations out
of a crowd, a pack of phone cables or mass-data microwave trans-
missions, because the computer may be programmed to start record-
ing when a particular pattern of words is used. In addition, com-
puters can separate and enhance several simultaneous
conversations. Indeed, voice patterns are somewhat like fingerprints,
and computers perhaps may be programmed with a particular voice
pattern triggering a transmitter or recorder to hone in on the sound.
In addition, the computer can improve the visual image in video
or photography by making clear a dark, murky, indistinct, or
blurred image. An optical scanner is used. Data is fed into the com-
puter with respect to regions in the picture containing minute differ-
ences in shade, with new shade values assigned until the picture be-
comes clear."
Computers are used by surveillance agents as they are by govern-
ment, private industry, and many citizens-as storehouses and or-
ganizers of data, quickly retrievable. Federal and state bureaucrats
maintain masses of data on Americans, with the federal government
alone storing an average of fifteen records on each citizen.1 2 Though
most of the files are in separate government units, the spread of
automation has made it easier for agencies to exchange information.
Moreover, while the amount of information in data banks likely will
increase several fold in the next several years, the capacity of the
computer will grow perhaps one hundred-fold. 3
Needless to say, the computer data bank is a wonderful tool for
providing efficient delivery of the array of services that Americans
want from government and from private industry. Social Security
checks are sped on their way; income tax data are scrutinized; infor-
mation (e.g., concerning missing children, or migratory workers) is
collected, organized, and made accessible for analysis and action
programs; criminal records are stored, added to, and made available
to geographically distant law enforcement officers.
Efforts go forward to increase the capacity of computers-not
only in collection, ordering, and retrieval-but in performing higher
11. See Hamit, supra note 7, at 193.
12. See infra note 35.
13. See Soma, supra note 2, at 453-454.
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level tasks. "Artificial intelligence"14 projects are underway; mean-
while, middle level success has been achieved, as Time's "Man of
the Year" improves, not only his chess prowess, but other skills.
Thus, for example, one patent has been awarded for a procedure
that helps machines recognize the sequence of particular spoken
words;15 another for producing a program that seeks to mimic the
analytical approach of a man trained to diagnose locomotive engine
problems.1 6
The advent of the computer offers no panacea, of course. The
computer may be asked to do things for which it was not designed;
individuals inputing information may be using erroneous data;
17
programmers may not understand the program task to which they
have been assigned; investigative bits and pieces of untested infor-
mation about an individual may become part of his file; information
collected for one purpose may be misunderstood when being used
for another purpose;'" intentionally false data may be fed in-as
when the federal government sought to conceal its bombing of Cam-
bodia.19 Only certain kinds of information may be readily entered
into the computer. (Phillip Morrison of MIT tells the parable of the
seismological map produced by data only since 1961 because prior
data could not easily fit into the program;2° similarly, the New York
Times is developing a data bank of events, including only that data
easily derivable as byproducts of typesetting sheets);2 computer
programs may be so complex that no one programmer involved in
developing the process completely understands it;22 or so intricate
that individuals (e.g., military personnel) using computerized equip-
14. N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1980, § 6, at 41, col. 1.
15. Helping Computers Understand Speech, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1983, § 1, at
34, col. 2.
16. Computer Systems Applying Expertise, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1983, at D1,
col. 1.
17. How to Dupe the Snoopers, Privacy - How to Protect What's Left of It,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1979, § 7, at 13, col. 1.
18. Make no Secret of It, The Right to Privacy Still Holds, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8,
1981, § 11, at 26, col. 1.
19. Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgement to
Calculation, excerpted in FBI Oversight: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st &
2d Sess. 40 (1978).
20. Id. at 39-40.
21. Id. at 40.
22. Id. at 34.
[Vol. 15
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ment may not be able to carry out their tasks."
Computer Networking
An important phenomenon in understanding the new social and
technological environment in which monitoring is taking place is
networking. An electronic communications network is a system in
which a person uses electronic means to transmit or receive audio,
video, data, or facsimile (copies of documents and photographs).
Traditional networks have been the telephone system and the com-
mercial radio and television networks.
A major new entrant into networking is the computer. Sophisti-
cated data communication networks already are playing a vital role
in government, banking, insurance, manufacturing, retailing, trans-
portation, health and education. There are now over one thousand
networks and subnets, connecting terminals in information trans-
mission, message exchange, mail message storage, and financial
transactions. The nets may connect terminals by leased telephone
lines, by radio and microwave transmission via earth station and
satellite directly, or by light wave. And it is suggested that soon
most computers will be attached to a telecommunications network
or at least be accessible by telephone number.2 "
Telenet operates one of the larger networks, providing facilities
for 1,200 subnetworks, and permitting access to 150,000 subscribing
entrants.2 5 Each network houses and exchanges information on al-
most every conceivable subject. Government agency subnets also are
in the system. Some indication of network scope is seen by the ac-
cess obtained by meddling youngsters into files of the nuclear weap-
ons laboratory at Los Alamos, a college, a Los Angeles bank, a can-
cer hospital, and a horse breeding association.
6
An offshoot of the general computer network is that of electronic
mail, whereby a transmitted message is stored in a receiving com-
puter terminal, until the latter is turned on. Many computer nets
now have this capacity. In addition, MCI Corporation and the U.S.
Postal Service have launched major competitor electronic mail pro-
grams. In 1980 the U.S. Postal Service started Interpost, an interna-
23. Pentagon Debating Commitment to Complex Computerized Arms, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 23, 1983, at 1, col. 3.
24. See Surveillance Technology: Joint Hearings, supra note 5, at 56.
25. Rising Use of Computer Networks Raises Issues of Security & Law, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 26, 1983, at 1, col. 3.
26. Id.
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tional electronic mail system, with documents to be dispatched elec-
tronically via satellite and then to cooperating overseas post offices.
In 1982, it started a domestic electronic mail service. Information is
transmitted to a receiving terminal, and then to the Western Union
network of lines and switches, and finally to 25 receiving post offices.
The message is then printed, and inserted into envelopes, and then
mailed. By 1990, the system is expected to handle 1/3 of the nation's
projected 75 billion pieces of mail.2"
In 1983, MCI, inaugurated its own system. A mailer types a mes-
sage on his terminal, using a modem, and sends the message to the
MCI computer. From there, it is relayed either to the addressee's
computer, or to the local US postal mailing area-to be transcribed
into written form and mailed, or hand delivered. 8
Another important offshoot of the general computer network is
the electronic funds transfer system (EFTS). The system is one in
which banks-locally or nationally-are in network. Banking nets
seek to offer improved financial services, reduce the flow of negotia-
ble paper, provide readily accessible account status, and in some in-
stances, to facilitate consumer retail purchases. Subscribers access
into the EFTS by computerized plastic cards, in making banking
transactions at Automated Teller Machines or at point-of-sale ter-
minals (in stores, hotels and restaurants). 29 Recently, it was an-
nounced that about 200 Ohio households, in an experiment, will be
allowed to do their banking from their homes, get their latest mail,
send mail via the computer, and buy merchandise.30
What is the potential of the electronic funds transfer system as a
government monitoring approach? In 1970, a group of experts in
computers, communications, and surveillance, said that the Soviet
Union's KGB could well employ it as a very effective and unobtru-
sive means of developing an almost complete portrait of the person
being monitored.3 1
27. See J. BAMFORD, supra note 8, at 377.
28. Described in an advertising brochure, mailed to the author (MCI Mail,
Washington, D.C.).
29. See Surveillance Technology: Joint Hearings, supra note 5, at 58.
30. In-Home Banking Due Here, Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Sept. 15, 1983, at 1,
col. 1.
31. See supra note 29.
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The New, Unified Telecommunications System and Networking
As important as computer nets are, they constitute just one part
of an increasingly complex telecommunications network system.
Technology has changed the face of the system and caused the de-
velopment of new nets, and revamped others. Indeed, technologies
in several industries-aerospace, computers, telephone, television,
recording, telegraphy, and copying-have converged and the result
is a unified communications system. 32 Companies from one commu-
nications sector now invade the traditional turf of others. Thus RCA
is building an electronic mail system for the U.S. Postal Service;
MCI, as we have seen, has launched an electronic mail service to
compete with the U.S. Postal Service. AT&T and Xerox also plan to
enter the electronic mail market. AT&T, in particular, while updat-
ing its transmission with satellite, laser, and fiber optics, is offering
video and computer transmission services to subscribers. IBM and
Xerox plan to offer single communications systems for the transmis-
sion of voice, data, facsimile, and video signals. Xerox's plan would
completely bypass the existing interstate and local telephone sys-
tem, employing, instead, metropolitan earth stations to transmit
signals.
Indeed, satellites now regularly transmit long distance messages,
each transmission pathway housing thousands of circuits, millions of
conversations, and billions of words and numbers. Such satellites
and portable earth stations, transmitting signals in digital form, can
provide networks completely independent of AT&T. Companies op-
erating satellites in space include Western Union, RCA, AT&T,
GTE, IBM, and Aetna Insurance. Now, because the range of modes
is transmitted on the same microwave path, a given message can em-
ploy the four modes-video, voice, data, and document facsimile.3
3
Two other systems are part of the new telecommunications real-
ity-teleconferencing and 2-way TV cable systems. The first, elec-
tronic simultaneous group interaction, can employ the full range of
modes. (AT&T is offering one system, and RCA has announced that
it will offer a competitor net.)3 4 As for cable TV, some cable nets
currently allow subscribers to order goods through their TV systems,
and to express their views on issues. Moreover, some other cable sys-
tems mechanically disclose subscriber program selections to
32. See Brock, supra note 4 at ch. 10.
33. Id. at 276.
34. U.S.A. Today, Oct. 12, 1983, at 2B, col. 3.
Winter 19841
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operators. 5
Tracking
Another effect of the technology revolution has been the develop-
ment of government systems to track the movements of individuals
or to identify persons with whom they communicate. Traditionally,
agents have engaged in visual surveillance of suspects by following
them closely in cars, watching them from a distance with high-
powered field glasses, observing them at public meetings, planting
an informant in their midst, or wiretapping or bugging. Now, track-
ing beacons transmit, to a central listening post, the locations of
moving objects, whether these objects are hand-held or in a vehicle
or airplane in which an individual is a passenger; and newer tech-
niques permit simultaneous tracking of many vehicles from a single
control station.3 6 Furthermore, a starscope device permits an agent
to engage in monitoring in total darkness. A pen register device
records the number dialed from a telephone, as well as the time of
the call and the length of the conversation. A mail cover permits the
temporary segregating of a suspect's mail and the recording of infor-
mation found on the outside of an envelope. (As more mail is dis-
patched electronically, rather than by paper, entry into the file pre-
sumably will permit a full content disclosure). Another tracking
means is closed-circuit television. For example, police in Miami
Beach recently installed closed circuit TV cameras to keep watch
along two streets in a high crime area. The federal Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration (LEAA) is funding closed circuit TV sur-
veillance projects in a number of cities, while many states are pro-
ceeding to install the equipment even without LEAA grants.3 " The
cameras need not be visible and may be operated even during night
hours. Indeed, it has been suggested that "[ilmaging technologies
should expand over the next several years to a point where minia-
ture, battery-powered, solid state night-viewing television cameras
will be able to visually monitor vast areas and relay complex signals
to a remote listening post."3 8
35. Report on Privacy- Who is Watching You, 93 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 34
(July 12, 1982).
36. See VanDewerker, supra note 7, at 154.
37. Note, Police Use of CCTV Surveillance: Constitutional Implications and
Proposed Regulations, 13 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 571, 572-574 (1980).
38. VanDewerker, supra note 7, at 207.
[Vol. 15
HeinOnline  -- 15 U. Tol. L. Rev. 608 1983-1984
SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY
Surveillance Nets
We have discussed, in broad terms, the new telecommunications
phenomenon of nets. What range of nets is involved in surveillance
in particular?
First, the person who is the subject of monitoring may himself be
in a electronic network, transmitting or receiving information. For
example, he may be talking by telephone or 2-way radio; he may be
sending messages by telegraphy; he may be transmitting a video pic-
ture or information by closed circuit or cable TV; he may be sending
computer-based messages, mail, or facsimile; he may be engaging in
financial transactions through computer connection. His communi-
cation may be being transmitted by traditional wire, radio waves, or
light waves (and perhaps through fiber optic cable).
Where the subject is in a network, the monitoring agent can seek
to enter the network by participant allowance, by establishing a
physical or induction connection to a wire network, by tuning into
the radio or video wave frequency-perhaps using a dish antenna to
capture microwave transmission-or by gaining access to the com-
puter network via password or decoding. Information about the
membership of a telephone network can be obtained by pen register,
as we have noted.
Where the subject is not in an electronic network, the govern-
ment agent can himself establish a network to facilitate monitoring.
Thus a radio transmitter bug can transmit audio to a monitoring
station; a TV camera, the video; a beeper attached to a moving ob-
ject, the changing location of the signal. Of course, a computer can
house a subject's data bank of information concerning credit,
finances, family, and associations; and as we have observed, it can be
programmed to enhance audio, video, and facsimile transmissions to
the monitoring station.
How difficult is it for the government to enter a net in which a
suspect is interacting? As for a computer net, entry is supposed to
be limited to subscribers and employees of the operator. Neverthe-
less, computer coding has not stopped a rash of illegal entries, even
by high school students with little technical expertise.3 9 The typical
need to have a network readily accessible and usable by legitimate
entrants has reduced security standards. Persistence, technical
know-how, and the availability of some decoders have increased the
chances of intrusion. The "access game" can be played by private
individuals, local government, federal domestic agencies, and inter-
39. See supra note 25.
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national government intelligence units.
Government agents, of course, have ready access to government
computer networks in order to determine whether the networks are
being improperly entered or misused. Increasingly, also, there is gov-
ernment agency exchange of computer data. For example, the IRS
and the Social Security Agency are required to provide the names
and addresses of young male taxpayers to the Selective Service, in
order to help track down persons who have not registered for the
draft;'0 the Secret Service may be able to use FBI computer files to
trace individuals who pose a threat to others being guarded;4 1 Selec-
tive Service is providing data to the Child Support Enforcement
Agency of the Department of Health and Human Services in order
to aid in locating men delinquent in child support payments. 4 2 And
the Reagan Administration has drafted a plan which would require
the Census Bureau to share with a number of government agencies
the personal information it collects about us all.'
3
A private institution also may supply data directly to the govern-
ment. It may do so either as part of a general legal requirement, in
acceding to a request, or on demand for particular items. For exam-
ple, the government of Massachusetts recently asked 117 banks to
provide data regarding welfare recipients' bank balances in order to
identify claimants with greater assets than those allowable. 44 Prose-
cutors, as well as government investigators, have called upon banks
- to the extent allowable under the law4 5 - to furnish documents
reflecting a suspect's financial transactions.
Government profiling of countless individuals, through the
purchase of computerized information, is taking place as well. 46
Thus, the IRS has bought from a direct (mail order) marketing com-
40. See supra note 35, at 36.
41. Secret Service May Get to Use F.B.I. Computer, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1982,
at 1, col. 2.
42. Senators to Examine Official Use of Computer Data on Individuals, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 13, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
43. Plan Would Give Census, IRS Data, Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Nov. 20, 1983
at 21A, col. 1.
44. Id.
45. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); California Bankers Assn. v.
Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974); Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 12 U.S. C. § 1829b(d) (1970);
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)
(an apparent response to Miller).
46. I.R.S. Starts Hunt for Tax Evaders, Using Mail-Order Concerns' Lists, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 25, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
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pany, a computerized list containing the names and addresses of two
million households, their estimated incomes, the birthday of the
head of the household, and the number of persons living in each
household.47 While it was not clear from the press report whether
the particular list identified probable race, other such lists commer-
cially available have done so."' The householders chosen by the IRS
for scrutiny were in Brooklyn, New York, and in the states of Wis-
consin, Indiana, and Nevada. The list will be matched with a list of
individuals in those geographic areas filing 1982 tax returns. The
purpose, obviously, is to uncover the identities of persons who failed
to file. If the experiment succeeds, the agency plans to obtain more
extensive lists. Furthermore, if the IRS can target Americans who
pay Uncle Sam no taxes, it will consider using the technique to iden-
tify those who underpay.4
9
Not just marketing companies may have "profile" lists of Ameri-
cans. TV cable system operators conceivably could collate informa-
tion they obtain about their subscribers and sell it to the govern-
ment. A given subscriber could be profiled based upon knowing the
programs he selects, the products he purchases through the cable
system, and the opinions he expresses through cable poll-back.50
Rather than obtaining data from a third party, however, the gov-
ernment can seek to gain entry for itself into a private computer
network. It may be permitted to do so through central network op-
erator authority or allowance of a particular subscriber. Absent
these routes, government agents may secretly attempt to determine
for themselves the password and key of a suspect, in order to access
47. Id. One marketing company opposed in principle to the IRS purchase, dis-
closed how it develops its own mailing lists. First it feeds into the computer, the
names and addresses found in every telephone book. It then assigns each household
to the correct U.S. Census tract. From the information published by the U.S. Census
Bureau, conclusions are made about each household, including median income, aver-
age family size, and probable race. In the states in which the information is available,
a marketing company matches data from the department of motor vehicles on the
model and year of the automobiles owned by the individuals at each address. Thus if
a car is an expensive one, the estimated income is adjusted upward. If low cost, down-
ward. Purchasers of the lists increasingly swamp the American public with "junk
mail" - whether seeking to persuade a householder to make a contribution to a par-
ticular charity, buy more insurance, order a magazine subscription, purchase a prod-
uct, get financial credit, or answer mail surveys.
48. Id.
49. Private Computers Income Data to Aid IRS in Hunt for Evaders, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 29, 1983, at 1, col. 3.
50. See supra note 35.
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a given net. Significantly, neither the federal Omnibus Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act of 1968"' nor apparently any other federal
law purports to prohibit the interception of computer transmis-
sions.52 Therefore, police agencies - and private persons, for that
matter - do not violate federal law in intercepting such transmis-
sions. The 1968 law was intended to proscribe the interception only
of voice transmission. But technology has resulted in a major loop-
hole in the law, perhaps even as to such voice communication. The
computer, as we have observed, is now a component in telephone
communications. Sound transmission is converted to computer digi-
tal transmission for a part of its journey from sender to receiver.
Given that the 1968 Act defines interception as "aural acquisition"
53
and that no sounds are being produced in digital transmission, it can
be argued that interception by anyone while conversation is in digi-
tal form does not violate the Act. In any event, federal and local
governmental agents have substantial leeway to engage in wiretap-
ping and bugging even where no such digital transmission is em-
ployed.54 The 1968 Act and the federal Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance-Act of 197855 permit electronic surveillance by court order.
And whether that warrant procedure has been a meaningful check
upon government abuse of the technique is open to serious question.
From 1969 to 1976, only 15 of about 5,000 applications to engage
in electronic surveillance, were denied by the sitting magistrates.5
As of December, 1982, no applications for monitoring upon foreign
agents within the U.S. had yet been turned down by the new U.S.
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court established in 1978.57 More-
51. Title III, Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20
(1968).
52. Loophole in Law Raises Concern About Privacy in Computer Age, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 19, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (4).
54. Loophole in Law Raises Concern About Privacy in Computer Age, supra
note 52. Contra Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11
(Supp. V 1980) which regulates government electronic surveillance of foreign agents.
That law refers not to "aural acquisition," as in Title III, but to "acquisition." Id. at
§ 1801 (f)(1). Accordingly, the argument that U.S. intelligence agents without a war-
rant could intercept conversation while it was in digital form would be less persuasive
as to the 1978 Act.
55. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11 (Supp. IV
1980).
56. A Law That's Too Nearly No Law at All, N.Y. Times, Jul. 15, 1977, at 23,
col. 1.
57. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978,
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over, participant surveillance requires no court order. 8 Nor presum-
ably does monitoring in public places-whether by transmitter, re-
corder, visual device, or beeper-unless the person subject to the
monitoring, given the circumstances, is deemed to possess a "legiti-
mate expectation of privacy. ' 59
Defense and Detection
Are there defenses to wiretapping and eavesdropping? The best
one can say is that there are precautions that reduce the risk. Nat-
urally, the best defense to audio surveillance is silence. Whispering
in guarded tones or choosing a place apparently far distant from
other persons, or conversely, in a crowd, can provide some protec-
tion. Disconnecting the telephone and electrical circuit may turn off
bugs that are in connection with the system. Other approaches in-
clude noise blocking (turning up the volume on the radio), jamming
(causing a squealing sound), and scrambling a conversation. One
new scrambler recently patented is called the "phasorphone." At the
point of the sender's transmission, voice and other signals are
changed by code or "key," and the same key must be used for un-
scrambling at the receiving end. The inventors declare that millions
of different cryptographic keys are available to choose from, and
they foresee computer, facsimile, and tape recording applications of
their method.6 0
Efforts to restrict visual surveillance include avoiding face to face
dealings, having meetings in darkened areas, and covering places
that could house cameras. However, the availability of starlightscope
devices, perhaps with fiber/optic lead-in (hair-thin glass wire able to
transmit light energy, and thin enough to insert into a vent), minia-
ture cameras with telescopic lenses, as well as planted TV cameras, 1
should undermine any assurance of defense.
Detection methods include employment of physical search, radio
probes, current drain meters (indicating by current reduction the
possible presence of a wiretap), and use of photoelectric cells (indi-
cating the presence of focused light waves). Recent history suggests,
(1981-1982 period), S. REP. No. 691, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1982) (additional views of
Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan).
58. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
59. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
60. Patents-Message Scrambler Devised, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1980, at 29, col.
6.
61. Hamit, supra note 7, at 192-93.
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however, that as one method of detection becomes available, surveil-
lance devices are modified or new ones introduced.62
Interception of satellite telecommunications-whether by private
individuals or by government-goes forward. For example, it was re-
cently reported that 250,000 American homes now have dish anten-
nas illegally intercepting TV cable signals being transmitted from
satellite.6 3 Furthermore, super secret government intelligence agen-
cies, like the National Security Agency-equipped with acres of
computers and a world-wide blanket of satellite stations-readily in-
tercept the four communication modes being transmitted by micro-
wave from different points on earth. 4 Optic non-radiating light en-
ergy transmission, however, may prove more difficult for the
eavesdroppers to intercept, at least for now. 5
How much illegal government wiretapping and eavesdropping are
taking place? How much unauthorized computer accessing? Given
the secrecy of the interceptions, we can only speculate about the
current practices of local police forces and federal agencies. Yet we
gain little comfort from denials, recalling denials in the recent past
by Attorneys General Kennedy and Katzenbach, Secretary of the
Treasury Dillon, and IRS Director Sheldon Cohen, apparently una-
ware of the bugging being engaged in by their subordinates.66 Nor is
the expressed indifference of some in government to moral or legal
constraints consoling.67 We remember the notorious Huston Plan,6
the Martin Luther King surveillance,6" and the substantial illegal
police wiretapping revealed by the Dash study.7
The debate concerning the appropriateness of electronic surveil-
62. A. Landever, supra note 3, at 76.
63. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1983, at 1, col. 8.
64. See J. BAMFORD, supra note 8, at 170-71.
65. Fiber Optic Cable Carries 40,000 Simultaneous Calls, Christian Science
Monitor, Nov. 11, 1983, at 21, col. 1.
66. A. Landever, supra note 3, at 93-95.
67. S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 968 (1976) (quoting testimony of W.
Sullivan before the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
respect to Intelligence Activities); J. BAMFORD, supra note 8, at 272-73, 301.
68. J. BAMFORD, supra note 8, at 272-73; S. REP. No. 755, supra note 67, at 921-
22.
69. S. REP. No. 755, supra note 8, at 79-80.
70. S. DASH, R. KNOWLTON, & R. SCHWARTZ, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959). See A.
Landever, supra note 3, at 93-95; Wiretap Suit Stirs New Haven Dispute, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 13, 1983, § 23, at 1, col. 5 (recent suit charging that New Haven Police in
1964-71 wiretapped 3,000 persons, including lawyers representing. both sides in pre-
sent litigation).
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lance continues unabated. Statistics regarding the number and im-
pact of legalized wiretapping and bugging practices are offered by
one side and the other. Proponents71 read them as demonstrating
monitoring's indispensability, given the nature of some major crimes
and the structure of criminal organizations, as well as the miniscule
impact upon innocent persons. Opponents72 see the statistics as
clearly showing meager results, lack of law enforcement need, and
the dragnet and rummaging impact upon thousands of innocent per-
sons. There also has been unease voiced about national data banks.
Yet the phenomenon of expanded computer and telecommunica-
tions nets and government accessing has been too recent to create
substantial debate.
II.
To what extent is the fourth amendment relevant to these devel-
opments in telecommunications, electronic surveillance, and data
accessing?
Historical Background
Several philosophical strands combined to weave the American
colonists' notion of freedom from unreasonable governmental inter-
ference: the Athenian conception that the citizen of the polis is ca-
pable of self-government; the stoic-Hebraic Christian belief in the
worth and religious dimension of each human; the Roman law's
treatment of one's home as sanctuary; the medieval teaching that
human authority is limited and that the immediate source of politi-
cal authority is the people; and Puritan and Parliamentary beliefs in
inherent human rights and the need for institutional protections.
7 3
71. National Commission for the Review of Federal and State Laws Relating to
Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance, Electronic Surveillance xiii, 3 (1976) (ma-
jority report); Shieber, Electronic Surveillance, the Mafia, and Individual Freedom,
42 LA. L. REV. 1323 (1982); Wiretap Amendments: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the Senate on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1980)
(statement of Clifford S. Fishman, Professor, Catholic University of America); See A.
Landever, supra note 3, at ch. IV, Extent of the Practice.
72. See A. Landever, supra note 3, at ch. IV Extent of the Practice, National
Commission, supra note 71, at xiii, 177 (minority report); R. CLARK, CRIME IN
AMERICA: OBSERVATIONS ON ITS NATURE, CAUSES, PREVENTION AND CONTROL (1970); H.
SCHWARTZ, TAPS, BUGS, AND FOOLING THE PEOPLE (1977).
73. See A. Landever, supra note 3, at ch. II; A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM
330 (1970).
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These ideas found fertile soil in mid-eighteenth century America,
whose people were spokesmen for a new "open society" 7 4-not
"open" in the sense of public spotlight, but rather in the sense of
freedom of an individual to go his own way. Official surveillance, the
customary practice in Imperial Rome, and during the medieval pe-
riod, was to be anathema in the new country's balance of privacy
and order.
7 5
Of course, the immediate concern of Framers like Madison, who
proposed the fourth amendment 7 6 was to prohibit to the new na-
tional government the authority to issue general warrants or writs of
assistance. The fear was that the central government's authority to
pass laws "necessary and proper" to carry out its enumerated pow-
ers might otherwise include such an authority to issue the war-
rants.77 General warrants had been used in eighteenth century Eng-
land, especially to ferret out vocal dissenters to Crown policy. The
warrants permitted exploratory searches through private homes and
offices; in other words, they authorized fishing expeditions for evi-
dence of wrongdoing.
7 8
While the English warrant experience had made a deep impres-
sion, the more vivid memory was the British practice of issuing writs
of assistance. These writs, used to uncover goods brought into the
colonies secretly during the 1760's, a period of rampant smuggling,
constituted an even more sweeping power than the general warrant.
The general warrant might issue to search for evidence concerning,
let us say, a particular seditious publication. By contrast, the writ
went further: it directed the local constable or sheriff to maintain
order whenever the Crown official chose to enter and search a house,
shop, or warehouse; entry could be upon any pretext, and without a
prior showing of justification. The officer could then seize what he
74. Kelly, Where Constitutional Liberty Came From, reprinted in FOUNDATIONS
OF FREEDOM IN THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 24 (A. Kelly ed. 1958).
75. See A. WESTIN, supra note 73, at 332.
76. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Madison's original wording was somewhat different. See A. Landever, supra note 3,
at 192.
77. See A. Landever, supra note 3, at 184; 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 455-56 (J. Gales
ed. 1789).
78. A. Landever, supra note 3, at 185.
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judged to be contraband or smuggling goods. The writ was not re-
turnable in court. Indeed, it remained in effect, in the hands of the
official, until the death of the reigning sovereign. 9
In order to safeguard the rights of the ordinary citizen, then, the
amendment would prohibit these hated practices. Remedy for abuse
might turn upon a particular incident in a given case; but it was the
prohibiting of the system of governmental interference, without jus-
tification or limits, that was the provision's primary aim. Aside from
exigency, persons wherever they happened to be, were to be free
from arrest, and their goods and papers free from seizure, except by
warrant. True, governmental badgering of citizens upon the streets,
and listening under the eaves of houses to discover incriminating ev-
idence likely were not meant to be covered by the guarantee. None-
theless, there was no dictionary extant. And the terms "papers and
effects" seemed to have a broad compass. Even in places such as
shops or warehouses, they were to be protected.8 0 Moreover, there is
no evidence from the historical record that good faith, probable
cause, indeed even actual uncovering of criminal evidence, righted
the constitutional wrong of not following the amendment's mandate.
Although the Framers had the general warrant and writs of assis-
tance specifically in mind, their frame of reference should not bind
the future as the technological and cultural environment changes.
History should be used to illumine, not blind, to allow each genera-
tion to deal responsibly with the predicament that it faces.8 ' Chief
Justice Marshall declared that it was "a constitution we are ex-
pounding . . . intended to endure for ages to come, and conse-
quently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. 
'
82
Therefore, at least so long as a norm is embodied in the Constitu-
tion, court interpretation should be employed to assure its contin-
ued vitality.
Nineteenth century legal scholars emphasized the fourth amend-
ment's importance. Justice Story referred to it as "indispensable to
the full enjoyment of the rights of personal security .... "83 Francis
79. See W. MCCLELLAND, SMUGGLING IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 42 (1912); A.
Landever, supra note 3, at 188.
80. See A. Landever, supra note 3, at 194-95.
81. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
362 (1974); Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional In-
terpretation, 31 U. CH1. L. REV. 502 (1964).
82. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407, 415 (1819).
83. A. WESTIN, supra note 73, at 332 (quoting 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 608-09 (2d ed. 1851)).
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Lieber said that it expressed the "'. . . antagonism' of the Anglo-
American law to [search] . . . 'without any other warrant than the
police hat, coat, and button.' "84
Indeed, the Supreme Court in the landmark Boyd85 case under-
scored the need to interpret the fourth amendment liberally. It was
not the breaking of one's door and the rummaging through one's
drawers that was determinative. Even a subpoena to compel the de-
fendant to produce certain documents or forfeit goods allegedly im-
properly imported would violate the amendment:
A close and literal construction deprives [constitutional provisions] of
half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if
it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts
to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against
any stealthy encroachments thereon.88
Nine years earlier, in Ex parte Jackson,8 7 the Court, in dicta, had
extended fourth amendment protection beyond one's person, house,
office, or warehouse. In that case, sealed letters, far distant from
sender or receiver, also were deemed to be within the amendment's
ambit. Such letters were "as fully guarded from examination and
inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if they
were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles
. . . wherever [such letters] may be." 8
Nor would entry by trick be permitted to circumvent the man-
date. For example, in Gouled v. United States,s9 a private, attached
to Army Intelligence, had pretended to make a friendly visit upon
the suspect. Once having gained entry into Gouled's office, and in
the suspect's absence, he had taken several incriminating docu-
ments. Justice Clarke, writing for a unanimous Court, declared that
entry by deceit was as much an intrusion as that by force or threat.90
84. A. WESTIN, supra note 73, at 332 (quoting F. LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND
SELF GOVERNMENT 46-47, 44 (1853)).
85. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
86. Id. at 635.
87. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
88. Id. at 733.
89. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
90. Id. at 305-06.
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The Functions of Privacy
The fourth amendment safeguards an individual against arbi-
trary government interference, and implicates at least in part, a sub-
stantial zone of privacy." And privacy serves important functions. It
gives the individual an opportunity to worship as he chooses, engage
in intimate relations, be tentative and experimental in his judg-
ments, select his own enjoyments, engage in frank communication
with his confidants, and seek respite. Not only does such privacy
release the creative energy of man, it offers an environment for
learning and growth, and for individual and group challenges to po-
litical policies-indeed to a current orthodoxy.92 Such an individual
and group motor operates the engine of pluralism so vital for a free
society.
Moreover, only a broad sphere of privacy can assure the essence
of human dignity. To Hanna Arendt, a life spent entirely in the
presence of others "loses the quality of rising into sight from some
darker ground which must remain hidden if it is not to lose its
depth. . . . ,93 Eric Hoffer warns "... [tihe fully assimilated indi-
vidual does not see himself and others as human beings. . . . He
has no purpose, worth and destiny apart from the collective body."'94
To Lasswell, only by guaranteeing a substantial sphere of privacy
can we erect an "unbreachable wall of dignity."9 5
Katz v. United States and Electric Surveillance
How have the Justices of the Supreme Court dealt with our tele-
communications predicament? Have their decisions reflected the
command and brooding spirit of the fourth amendment? In 1967, in
a major case, the Justices took long strides toward developing a
meaningful constitutional framework for our day. The case was Katz
91. Freedom from government interference and a right of privacy are not coex-
tensive. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967). For an analysis of the
concept of privacy generally, and the impact of technology upon it, see A. MILLER,
ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS (1971); A. WESTIN,
supra note 73; Bazelon, Probing Privacy, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 587 (1977).
92. See A. Landever, supra note 3, at 48.
93. H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 71 (1958).
94. E. HOFFER, TRUE BELIEVER: THOUGHTS ON THE NATURE OF MASS MOVEMENTS
61 (1951).
95. Lasswell, Threat to Privacy, quoted in CONFLICT OF LOYALTIES 134 (R. MacI-
ver, ed. 1952).
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v. United States,96 a watershed in search and seizure, and monitor-
ing, law.
In Katz, government agents, without a warrant, placed an elec-
tronic recorder device on the outside of a public telephone booth.
According to the government, the agents had not done so until there
was a strong probability that Katz would be using the telephone to
transmit gambling information to persons in other states. The of-
ficers correctly predicted that he would use the booth for several
minutes at approximately the same time each morning. They ob-
tained recordings, averaging some three minutes each, of Katz's end
of the conversations. On the single occasion that they intercepted
the conversation of another person inadvertently, the agents re-
frained from listening.
Several points should be made about Katz. First, and perhaps
foremost, the Court found the fourth amendment to be applicable
out of a concern for the liberty of the ordinary citizen.9 7 There is no
solicitude for Katz, the suspect, although his conviction is being re-
versed. Second, the Court appears to presume the good faith of the
agents. There is no suggestion that they pursued their investigation
for any reason other than to seek to obtain evidence of a federal
crime. Indeed, the Court assumes, arguendo, that there was a proba-
ble cause, and that the surveillance was so narrowly circumscribed
that a judge would have granted a warrant. But the fact that a judge
might have issued a warrant did not excuse the failure to apply for
one.98 Third, the Court, reaffirms that not only tangibles, but also
conversations, are reached by the fourth amendment.9 Fourth, even
a person calling from a telephone booth on a public street - outside
fixed premises or an automobile - may have protection.'"° Fifth,
there is recognition that the telephone system is considered so vi-
tal' ' to society in our culture that the communication is protected,
although the operator of the system, presumably known to the par-
ties, can listen in. Sixth, doctrine must take account of the increased
capacity of equipment; thus physical trespass no longer is re-
96. 389 U.S. 347 (1967); See Amsterdam, supra note 75, at 382; see generally W.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1978).
97. 389 U.S. at 359.
98. Id. at 356-57.
99. Id. at 353.
100. Id. at 351-52.
101. Id.
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quired. 0 2 Seventh, the fourth amendment's guarantees are designed
to protect persons. Thus, where the person happens to be is not au-
tomatically determinative.0 3
Katz represents a giant step forward. It attempts to come to
grips with the concern voiced by Brandeis in his landmark dissent in
Olmstead.10 4 The "people's lawyer" had urged that "every unjustifi-
able intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the indi-
vidual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation
of the Fourth Amendment." 10 5 Society, however, must be on guard:
Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become
available to the Government. Discovery and invention have made it
possible for the Government, by means far more effective than
stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whis-
pered in the closet. 0 6
Speaking almost prophetically, Brandeis added:
Ways may some day be developed by which the Government, without
removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court,
and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate
occurrences of the home.'
Unfortunately, even Katz does not travel far enough to accom-
modate today's environment. The majority opinion declared that
where one exposes something to public view,' 08 there is no protec-
tion. While this proposition may seem eminently reasonable, it does
not stand up under analysis, especially as applied in subsequent
cases to dialed telephone numbers, 0 9 the automobile moving
through public streets,"0 and information supplied in carrying out
banking transactions."'
102. Id. at 353.
103. Id. at 351.
104. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
105. Id. at 478.
106. Id. at 473.
107. Id. at 474.
108. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
109. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
110. United States v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983).
111. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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The Katz majority opinion, written by Justice Stewart, con-
cluded that the fourth amendment protects Katz's effort to preserve
his privacy in this instance. Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion,
more precisely stated a two part test, later followed. 2 by the Court:
[F]irst that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as "reasonable." 113
In subsequent cases, however, less emphasis has been placed on
the need to demonstrate the first prong." 4 And rightly so! Not only
is it difficult to ascertain such a subjective expectation, but constitu-
tional rights should not depend upon its presence. Many an individ-
ual (perhaps a political dissenter, a criminal accused, a welfare cli-
ent, or, indeed, counsel for such a person) reasonably harbors some
doubts about the privacy of his communications. As Professor Am-
sterdam has pointed out in a seminal article, what should count is
not what we expect, but what we are entitled to demand" 5 from
-government in letting us alone.
Thus the second and more fundamental prong of the Katz test is
that there be a legitimate expectation of privacy." 6 Such a position
is sound, provided that attention centers upon what the framers
sought to ensure against-a governmental system of untrammeled
searches threatening John Q. American-and not upon the unsavory
character of a particular defendant and his criminal enterprise.
Such a legitimate expectation should take account of a range of
factors: the core values of the amendment, other societal concerns
and needs, a person's conduct, the nature of the telecommunications
system, and the changing culture and environment. Here, for exam-
ple, Stewart emphasized that Katz had shut the door of the enclosed
telephone booth." 7 Today, instead of an enclosed booth, one finds
no door, indeed, no booth. There now are multiple, open-air public
telephone units, crowded together. Yet the telephone system re-
mains just as vital as it was when Katz was decided. Indeed, perhaps
112. United States v. Knotts, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 1085 (1983).
113. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
114. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979); United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971); id. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
115. Amsterdam, supra note 81, at 384.
116. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
117. Id. at 352.
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it is more so than in 1967, given our increased mobility and de-
mands for greater speed in decision-making, especially in business.
Therefore, in view of our commitment to freedom from arbitrary
government interference wherever one happens to be, a Katz in 1984
should still be protected from the electronic bug not authorized by a
warrant.
Since rendering the Katz decision, the Court has never squarely
dealt with the question whether wiretapping and bugging, even pur-
suant to warrant under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 196818 is constitutional. " 9 In an earlier analy-
sis, '2 the author concluded that the practice, at least absent a will-
ing participant, was equivalent to a search pursuant to an unconsti-
tutional general warrant. The Court, however, in a number of
cases"' interpreting Title III, has seemed to sanction the practice.
Perhaps more important, law enforcement officials continue to be-
lieve it indispensable.'2 2 Under the circumstances, rather than to
foster an underground government practice, it may make more sense
to attempt to have meaningful warrant procedures.
The promise of Katz, regrettably, has not been fulfilled. In the
subsequent monitoring cases to reach the Court, the tribunal invari-
ably has concluded that the suspects had a "free choice" whether to
communicate incriminating information,'2 3 engage in certain activi-
ties, 24 or furnish incriminating materials. 125 In other words, the
Court has deemed that the suspects have "assumed the risk." As
shall be demonstrated, the Court's approach is not only unrealistic;
it also is in conflict with fourth amendment values.
118. See supra note 2.
119. Galloway, The Uninvited Ear: The Fourth Amendment Ban on Electronic
General Searches, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 993, 1018 (1982).
120. See A. Landever, supra note 3.
121. See, e.g., Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979); Scott v. United States,
436 U.S. 128 (1978); United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
122. See supra note 71.
123. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (pen register); United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (participant monitoring).
124. United States v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983) (beeper tracking auto on a
public way); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (data bank stores identity of those
receiving certain dangerous prescription drugs).
125. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (bank under subpoena furnishes
government with records reflecting depositor's financial transactions).
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Smith v. Maryland and Pen Registers
In Smith v. Maryland,'26 after a robbery victim gave the police a
description of the robber and of the automobile he had been driving,
she began receiving obscene and threatening calls. These turned out
to be from the robber. The police spotted a man and automobile
that met the description; and without a warrant, they had the tele-
phone company install a pen register at the central offices to record
numbers being dialed from his home phone. The device revealed
that he was indeed dialing the victim's number.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, invoked Harlan's two-
pronged test. Blackmun determined that Smith had no expectation
of privacy in the dialed numbers. He reasoned that Smith, like other
telephone users, doubtlessly realized that the numbers dialed were
being conveyed to the telephone company, and that the company
had facilities for making records for purposes of billing. Second,
even if Smith had a subjective expectation of privacy, it was not
"one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.' 21 7 This is
so because a person can have no valid expectation of privacy as to
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.
The weaknesses of the majority's reasoning in Smith become evi-
dent when one considers these basic facts:
(1) The telephone system is a vital extension of ourselves in our
culture. Its use is so important that the Court in Katz upheld Katz's
right to protection, even though he was calling from a public (though
enclosed) street booth.
(2) The numbers dialed are the "key" that unlocks the system.
(3) Permitting untrammeled, secret, central station recording un-
doubtedly will discourage telephone use.
(4) The dialed numbers themselves, without regard to the specific
content of the messages in particular, provide an effective tracking
means, creating a caller's profile by identifying the range of his as-
sociations - whether intimate, business, political, or religious." 8
Given these considerations, then, we should impose a warrant re-
quirement before permitting the government to employ the device.
Indeed, the Court's position to the contrary seems to be like telling
a person he can do whatever he wants in his home, provided the
126. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
127. Id. at 743 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
128. Id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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government is kept posted as to the identities of visitors as they ring
his doorbell. Admittedly, the home is a primary sanctuary, but the
analogy is an apt one nonetheless.
Is there a material difference between the facts in Katz, and
those in Smith? It is doubtful. After all, Katz presumably knew that
the telephone company could listen in on his conversations, yet he
blithely proceeded to incriminate himself. Katz did not assume the
risk, because the Court chose not to have him do so.
The problem lies with the Court's notion of "choice." The idea
obviously has an empirical dimension. (e.g., we cannot fly in the air
without some help). But it has a value aspect as well. Thus, a person
in his home should not be deemed to have free choice to remain
silent permanently. We do not assume such choices because it would
make life intolerable for most of us. Two basic questions come to
mind: (1) If the telephone is a vital means of communication in
1984, and the dialing mechanism is the only means to use it, ought
we to permit unlimited government employment of the pen register?
(2) Ought the Court to be speaking in terms of a voluntary furnish-
ing of information, as if that were a separate transaction? The an-
swer to both questions is "No." The act of dialing is a necessary part
of the larger telephoning process, and "ordinary citizen" Smith had
no meaningful choice.
United States v. White and Participant Surveillance
The concept of "choice," together with another idea, "false
friend," is at the heart of United States v. White.1 " In White, fed-
eral agents, without obtaining a warrant, wired an informer with a
radio transmitter, and had him engage the suspect in conversation.
The informer talked with White at the informer's house, in a restau-
rant, in an automobile, and in White's home. Subsequently, based
on the testimony of agents listening in to the conversation, White
was convicted of a narcotics violation. The informer was not called
to testify.
Finding no violation of White's constitutional rights, the Su-
preme Court sustained the conviction. Justice White announced the
decision in a plurality opinion concurred in by three other jus-
tices.130 White's plurality opinion takes the position that a suspect
assumes the risk that a trusted confidant, to whom he discloses his
criminal enterprise, will turn out to be 'not simply a government
129. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
130. Id. (Burger, C.J., Potter, J., and Blackmun, J. joined the plurality opinion).
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agent, but one electronically equipped."' Nor does it matter that
the information obtained is used, not merely to corroborate the tes-
timony of a participant, as in Lopez v. United States,"2 but rather
as an independent basis for proof of the charges.
Yet what is so wrong with electronic participant surveillance, un-
restrained by court order? As an ordinary informer is permitted to
reconstruct the given conversations as best he can, why should we
foreclose use of much more reliable means to recapture the commu-
nication? Fair questions! The answers lie in recognizing that the
"false friend" approach, in employing a too-narrow focus, miscon-
ceives the fourth amendment's underlying aim. That aim is to pro-
tect the citizen from a government system of uncontrolled and un-
justified intrusions. In employing the "false friend" analysis, the
plurality wrongly dwells upon the suspect and the criminal enter-
prise. Indeed, there is an assumption of risk built into the fourth
amendment but it is a different one from that described by the plu-
rality in White. It is rather that a free society assumes the risks
attendant upon vigorously enforcing fourth amendment values. At
bottom, the provision mandates a system of magistrate-determined
searches.
Why was defendant Katz treated as if he were an ordinary citi-
zen - even though the Court knew he was a crook - while defend-
ant White was not? Because Katz did all he could? But Katz used a
public telephone; he could have used a private phone. Katz presum-
ably was aware that the telephone company theoretically had access
to his call. He could have sent a sealed letter. He was not required
to take these steps; yet he was not deemed to have assumed any
risk.
The electronically equipped "false friend" approach wrongly as-
sumes a static set of circumstances: police always acting in good
faith, entry only upon reasonable suspicion, and no chill in citizen
communication despite the lack of court limits. Certainly, past pat-
terns of government abuse in employing electronic surveillance
should give us pause. Moreover, the nature of the communication -
bits and pieces of talk on all manner of subjects - provides a fur-
ther cause for concern. The cold, neutral recording may grossly dis-
tort the meaning of that talk. And given the tens of thousands of
131. Id. at 749, 751. The Court cites Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966)
and endorses On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
132. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
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such entries each year, 133 hesitance to engage in frank communica-
tion should come as no surprise.
Nonetheless, the plurality, employing its own assumptions of fact
about police practice and societal reality, reaffirmed the Court's ear-
lier holding in On Lee'" that such an entry does not violate the
fourth amendment. Admittedly, both in White and in On Lee there
was a reasonable basis for the belief that incriminating evidence
would be obtained by the government action. The two decisions to-
gether, however, provide "open season" for an agent to engage in
participant surveillance on the merest suspicion. Furthermore, the
rulings probably will encourage other acts of monitoring. Suppose,
for example, a "false friend" allowed to come into the suspect's
premises, installs a bug to operate in the agent's absence. Or the
agent pretends he is the "gas man," and does the same. Or he at-
taches a bug to an object that a suspect unwittingly brings into his
home. Is the suspect now deemed to have assumed the risk? Once
the genie of deceit is loosed, it does not seem to be easily confined.
United States v. Knotts and Tracking Beepers
The most recent U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with electronic
monitoring concerns a beeper that tracks an automobile's location as
the car travels along the public streets. And once again, the Court
misconceives the idea of assumption of risk.
In United States v. Knotts,"' police had good reason to believe
that some persons were involved in an illicit drug manufacturing op-
eration and that one of them was about to buy a chemical to be used
in the process. The authorities arranged with the seller to place a
beeper inside the can housing the chemical about to be purchased.
Police then followed the car in which the container had been placed,
at first maintaining contact with the automobile by using visual sur-
veillance. Ultimately, they traced, by beeper alone, the movements
of a second car into which the object had been put. That car's jour-
ney came to an end in front of defendant Knott's cabin, where the
manufacturing operation was located.
The Court held that a person has no reasonable expectation of
133. White, 401 U.S. at 770 (Harlan, J., dissenting), referring to A. WESTIN,
supra note 73.
134. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 753 (1952) (the Court distinguishes
the deceitful entry to seize tangibles). See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298
(1921).
135. 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983).
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privacy as to the movements of an automobile, traveling along a
public way. One assumes the risk that the car is being visually ob-
served at every point along its route. 1 31 Moreover, nothing in the
fourth amendment prohibits the police, even absent warrant, from
augmenting their sensory faculties with scientific equipment, at least
where there is no expectation of privacy. 3 7 To Justice Rehnquist,
who spoke for the Court, "reality hardly suggests abuse."' 38 There
will be time enough should dragnet-type law enforcement eventually
occur. Thus, according to the Court, claimant Knotts was simply as-
sembling a "parade of horrors," and the Court was not impressed.
The Court's position, therefore, is that a person assumes the risk
that others can view and follow an automobile traveling along public
streets. Thus, beeper tracking may be used because it merely en-
hances our senses. But the beeper is not a mere visual enhancer;
rather it is a replacement for visual surveillance. It serves to
pinpoint the general location, with visual surveillance taking place
only after the location is established. Perhaps helicopter surveil-
lance is closest in analogy. But the nature of present helicopter tech-
nology drastically limits use of the technique. After all, how many
helicopters are available at one time? Strict selectivity must take
place, helping to assure that the innocent person's car will not be
tracked by the copter. By contrast, tiny beepers can be hooked up to
many cars, the devices transmitting signals simultaneously to a cen-
tral listening post. Undoubtedly, the number capable of being moni-
tored at one time will expand substantially as the telecommunica-
tions revolution proceeds.
The issue is not whether we should foolishly reject monitoring
enhancers of police effectiveness. It is whether the constitution,
properly understood, imposes mechanisms for limits and justifica-
tion, prior to their use. Until now, we have been able to maintain a
certain sphere of privacy, even while outside-while driving along a
highway, walking on a quiet street, or milling in a crowd. Beepers,
and other public tracking systems (such as closed circuit television)
change that. They constitute central listening posts, recording our
every movement.
Interestingly, the very case Justice Rehnquist cites for the propo-
sition that "reality hardly suggests" abuse is Zurcher v. Stanford
136. Id. at 1085.
137. Id. at 1086.
138. Id. (quoting Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978)).
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Daily News.'3 9 Yet, that case was unlike the beeper and monitoring
cases in two significant respects: First, there was a search warrant,
authorizing search of the student-run newspaper office. Second, the
situation in Zurcher was unrelated to the telecommunications
revolution. Photographs and negatives were being sought; there was
no effort to intercept an electronic message or to access a net.
Admittedly, beepers now may not effectively track when an ob-
ject is being followed in an area where there are large buildings since
there will be much background electrical interference. Given our
telecommunications revolution, refinements surely will reduce that
difficulty (for example, through use of special radio wave frequencies
and computer programs).140 It does not seem unreasonable to con-
clude, therefore, that the greater the accessibility, the less likely po-
lice will be selective, and the more likely the devices will be subject
to abuse. As the rule stands, no warrant requirement restricts the
police.
In Knotts,"' the cabin owner believed that he lacked standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the original warrantless installa-
tion in the container. Therefore, the Court did not pass upon the
question. Yet what can be clearer than that freedom from untram-
meled monitoring by a concealed beeper can only be protected by
warrant? Permission of some seller who may have little concern
about an individual subject to investigation does not seem a mean-
ingful check. Nor does unknowing acceptance of the object by a per-
son entering a car about to travel the public way; and surely not
such willingness by a person at his home, unwittingly bringing the
beeper into his house. It is noteworthy that the Court has now
granted certiorari in another beeper case, United States v. Karo.
142
The Court is to consider the fourth amendment implications both of
a warrantless transfer of a container housing a beeper installed with
the consent of the original owner of the container, and warrantless
monitoring from the beeper as the container is placed by suspects in
private storage lockers or private homes.
If technology continues apace, beepers will become even more
easily concealed, and more powerful. In addition, they likely will be-
come easily attached to all manner of objects, even garments. Given
139. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
140. See Hamit, supra note 7, at 193.
141. United States v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. 1081, 1084 n.** (1983).
142. 710 F.2d 1435 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3526 (Jan. 17,
1984) (No. 83-850).
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the technological advances, then, perhaps we had better reexamine
that parade of horrors.
United States v. Miller -Furnishing Banking Documents to
Government
A different kind of assumption of risk was present in United
States v. Miller.143 There, the Court held that a depositor assumes
the risk that copies of his checks, deposit slips, and monthly state-
ments will be furnished to the government by his bank in response
to a subpoena served upon the latter. The documents are said to be,
not the depositor's, but rather bank records and the checks, in par-
ticular, mere negotiable instruments. No fourth amendment inter-
ests were deemed implicated in Miller. Accordingly, receipt of the
materials upon subpoena to the third party bank did not violate the
depositor's rights. Of course, two years after Miller, and in apparent
response to it, Congress imposed severe restrictions upon federal
government access to such materials.1 44 The government still may
obtain financial records by depositor consent, warrant, court order,
or subpoena. Significantly, though, the depositor must now be noti-
fied; and he may challenge access except where judicial warrant has
been obtained.
The Supreme Court in Miller, however, was considering the ex-
tent of any constitutional requirement. And the tribunal found no
such restriction upon government access. The facts were that, under
subpoena and without notice to Miller, two banks had indeed pro-
vided such copies of documents to the government. The materials
were then used in evidence to convict him of possession- of an unre-
gistered still and related violations.
The real issue raised by Miller is not whether individuals should
expect their bank records to remain confidential. In this day, we are
entitled to be somewhat skeptical. Although the records in Miller
were subpoened from the bank in the course of a specific criminal
investigation, the then applicable federal law conferred a broad au-
thority to require banks to routinely submit reports of their deposi-
tors' transactions.15 The fundamental question before the Court
143. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
144. See Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980); Soma, supra note 2, at 467.
145. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d) (1970). However, Powell
and Blackmun concurring in California Banker's Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78
(1974), believed that the broad language of the 1970 Act effectively was narrowed by
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was whether the Constitution permits that degree of access to bank-
ing records without requiring the government to justify, upon notice
to the depositor, to a court its particular instrusions.
To be adequately answered, this basic question posed by Miller
should be considered with the following thoughts in mind: First,
banking in today's society is indispensable. The ordinary citizen is
not about to put his money under his mattress, open a Swiss bank
account, or close his own account. One may find a way to avoid us-
ing a telephone, but is is pretty hard not to have a bank account of
one kind or another. Second, providing information and documents
is necessary in order to use that account. As with dialing a telephone
number or putting an address on an envelope, we have no meaning-
ful choice in this culture but to furnish the material.
Accordingly, turning over such documents to our bank should
not be deemed an exercise of free choice. To consider it so, absent a
court mechanism for depositor intervention (for example, to chal-
lenge the grounds or appropriateness of a subpoena) effectively
countenances interception and use of the materials, upon any degree
of suspicion. Theoretically, a bank, served with a subpoena, may
contest it, in its customer's interest. Yet such a response should not
be relied upon. Moreover, one must grasp the extent of a profile ob-
tainable from scrutiny of an individual's banking records. In our so-
ciety, "little is free but happiness," and increasingly our checks, as
well as our other financial records, tell "who we are."
Nor can we ignore the current development of electronic funds
transfer nets.1 46 The government, under Miller's statement of con-
stitutional doctrine, presumably could access our electronic transac-
tions as they are happening. The government would then have an
up-to-date printout of our financial transactions. Accordingly, to re-
iterate, where we provide documents in carrying out our banking ac-
tivities, as a matter of constitutional law we should not be deemed
to have assumed the risk of untrammeled delivery of the materials
to the government.
Whalen v. Roe and Centralized Data Banks
Whalen v. Roe 4" involves banks, too, but a different kind -
computer central data banks. Here, too, there is deemed to be an
administrative regulations. Id.
146. See supra text accompanying note 29.
147. 429 U.S. 589 (1977), reversing sub nom Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F.Supp. 931
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). The lower court had found a fundamental privacy right in the physi-
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assumption of risk. Actually, it is a double risk: the first risk is that
one's participation in a lawful activity will be made known to the
government, and the information housed in the latter's data bank;
the second risk is that such information, although it may be stigma-
tizing and potentially incriminating, will be misused by a govern-
ment agency or improperly disclosed to the public.
In Whalen, the Court upheld a New York law requiring doctors
to submit copies of their prescriptions for certain dangerous drugs
- opiates, methadone, and amphetamines. Information to be sup-
plied and fed into the state's central computer bank included the
identification of the prescribing physician, the dispensing pharmacy,
the drug and dosage, and, most significantly, the patient's name, ad-
dress, and age. Some patients, however, feared that misuse of the
data might lead to their stigmatization as drug addicts; and this
concern apparently discouraged them from seeking the required
medication.
Finding no evidence suggesting a breakdown of security or im-
proper administration, the Court upheld the law. Justice Stevens'
opinion for the Court emphasized that the patient identification re-
quirement might reasonably aid in the law's effort to minimize mis-
use of the dangerous drugs. The state, given its broad police power
here, had no burden to establish actual necessity for the require-
ment. For the law on its face did not pose a sufficiently grievious
threat either to a privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters or one in personal autonomy. Thus, there was no fourteenth
amendment liberty violation. To the Court, moreover, fourth
amendment search and seizure and first amendment privacy of asso-
ciation interests clearly were not implicated."4 8
Nonetheless, the Court opinion observed that the "right to col-
lect and use (personal) data for public purpose is typically accompa-
nied by a concomitant . ..duty to avoid unwarranted disclosure"
and this duty "arguably has its roots in the constitution."' 49 And
Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, expressed unease about
the central data bank system, which "vastly increase[s] the potential
for abuse of that information.""1 ' Yet for Stewart, in his concur-
rence, there simply was no constitutionally mandated "general inter-
cian-patient relation, by virtue of the 14th amendment liberty clause. Accordingly,
that court had imposed a burden on the government to establish "necessity" for the
patient-identification requirement. Id.
148. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n. 32 (1977).
149. Id. at 605.
150. Id. at 606-07.
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est in freedom from disclosure of private information.'' 1
Is the Court's approach in Whalen sound? On one hand, the real
potential for abuse of such dangerous drugs clearly provides reason
for developing data. On the other hand, that same potential for
abuse suggests that the data (revealing, as it would, former patient
patterns of use) could easily provide incriminating evidence. Given
the readily retrievable information, and the phenomenon of inter-
agency exchange, it is more than speculation that the data would
become part of a suspect's criminal dossier. In addition, the recent
rash of illegal accessing, even of government files, suggests that at
least until coding becomes more sophisticated, concerns about secur-
ity breakdowns are understandable.
Thus, liberty interests, and even fourth amendment concerns, are
present. At least where information relates to a person's private
medical consultation, and data bank misuse or breakdown can lead
to stigma or incrimination, the Court should reject the traditional
rational basis standard. Instead, the state should be required to
demonstrate both an important governmental interest in such infor-
mation and that electronic storage is substantially related to that
interest.'52
Mail Covers
The Supreme Court has never considered the constitutionality of
mail covers, whereby a suspect's mail is segregated temporarily
while notation is made of -the information on the envelope. In Ex
parte Jackson,153 in dicta, the Court had said that the contents of a
sealed letter were inviolate, absent warrant, although the outward
form and weight could be examined. The Court, however, did not
indicate whether a mail cover would be permitted.
Analogizing from Smith v. Maryland,"4 lower courts typically
have found mail covers to be constitutional.' 55 The Supreme Court
is likely to follow suit. In Smith, the Court ruled that the suspect in
dialing a telephone number, assumed the risk that the telephone
151. Id. at 609.
152. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
153. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
154. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
155. See United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 953 (1978), appeal after remand, 619 F.2d 21 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951
(1980); Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
951 (1968).
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company would provide information regarding the number called to
the police. Therefore, the government undoubtedly will argue that a
letter writer assumes a similar risk as to envelope information.
If the "assumption of the risk" analysis is unsound as to tele-
phone communication, it is more so in the case of sealed mail. For
more than 100 years, letter contents have been deemed protected
against uncontrolled government monitoring. Indeed, letter writers
probably have a greater expectation of privacy as to the contents of
their communication than do telephone callers, who often half-joke
that "someone may be listening in." Like the pen register, the mail
cover practice allows a profiling of the initiator of communication by
identifying those he is seeking to contact. Unrestricted by court lim-
its, agents at times in the past have undertaken the practice improp-
erly. Indeed a Senate study'56 in 1965 found a lack of central admin-
istrative qontrols and abuse in the system, in which 1,000 mail
covers were being carried out per month. Unconfined, the practice
cannot but discourage use of the mails. Therefore, given the long
tradition of privacy associated with use of the mails, the role of the
mail in our society, and the likely negative impact of mail covers,
the latter practice should be brought under court controls.
Electronic Mail System
It is projected that by 1990 the new electronic mail system will
handle about one third of the nation's mail. 157 And, until technology
advances further, access into the system is full content access. In
addition, the new system will have security weaknesses at those
points at which system employees read the messages on their receiv-
ing terminals, and then type and place them in envelopes, or relay
the messages to the target terminals.
Obviously, if a mail cover should be prohibited absent a warrant,
so should full content access into electronic mail. The mailer should
have to abide by a particular electronic system's security arrange-
ments. But once he does so, he should not have to assume the risk
that the net operator, the operator's employees, or other subscribers
will permit the government to access his mail.
156. Note, Invasion of Privacy: Use and Abuse of Mail Covers, 4 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PRoBs. 165, 170 (1968).
157. See J. BAMFORD, supra note 8 at 377.
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Computer Networking
What about computer networking in general? Should the fourth
amendment govern the computer activities here-such as message
exchange, message storage (a variation of electronic mail), and infor-
mation transmittal services? Of what significance is the particular
transmission mechanism? Computer nets use either leased tele-
phone copper lines, or some other transmission means-microwave
transmittal via earth station or satellite, light wave transmittal, per-
haps through fiber optic cables.
Shall the network operator be likened to the telephone company
that is obligated not to divulge telephone contents? Or to the bank
in Miller, required to provide the government with documents con-
cerning the depositor? How much weight should be given to a sub-
scriber's subjective expectations? A computer user may have less of
an expectation of privacy than a telephone user, especially given the
spate of headlines about unauthorized accessing and the generally
lax security procedures. Moreover, there is no established tradition
on the part of the computer operator to maintain confidences.
Nonetheless, the main point to bear in mind is that the computer
net already is a vital link in the telecommunications system. It is
being used, not only to transmit business and government data; but
also to communicate ad hoc, tentative reflections, as well as our in-
nermost thoughts. Accordingly, the fourth amendment should be
held to secure, absent a warrant, freedom from interception. More-
over, a ntt user should not have to assume the risk that the net
operator or other subscriber will allow the government to enter. At
least, that is, where the parties in communication have made reason-
able efforts to comply with the code and password requirements of a
particular net.
Electronic Funds Transfer Systems
We have contended that a bank account is a necessity in our cul-
ture. Moreover, we soon may have no choice but to engage in elec-
tronic funds transfer. This development increases the accessability
to government of our personal banking information. Perhaps the
growing spotlight upon our banking transactions is symbolized by
the new, open-air, Automated Teller Machines dotting the land-
scape. Computerized data will be in network, not only among partic-
ipating banks (local and national), but among those merchants opt-
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ing to sell goods and services through the system. 8
As we have indicated, government opportunities to profile a
given suspect by his electronic banking transactions go far beyond
the Miller situation. Accordingly, such transactions should be
thought of as part of our new commercial culture, and be held, as a
matter of constitutional law, to be unavailable to government with-
out judicially determined cause.
Closed Circuit TV Monitoring Along Public Streets
Closed Circuit TV monitoring is an even greater intrusion than
beeper tracking. The latter locates the position of an object. The
former "puts us on television." Increasingly, there will be capacity to
screen vast areas and report to distant monitoring stations, 159 along
with a two-way audio-video and monitoring facilities. True, the pub-
lic setting traditionally has not been a privacy sanctuary. Persons, in
the past, assumed the risk that someone was following them or lis-
tening in upon their conversation. Yet electronic surveillance has
changed the dimensions of our environment. Uncontrolled, secret,
video monitoring is at odds with personal dignity and a relaxed citi-
zenry. Accordingly, it makes sense to impose restrictions upon the
practice.
Perhaps consideration of the kind of warrant requirement im-
posed in Camara v. Municipal Court'"0 would be instructive here. In
Camara, the Supreme Court ruled that a warrant was needed for
entry to inspect a dwelling for housing code violations. But probable
cause for issuance did not require a showing that a particular dwell-
ing appeared to be violating the code. Instead, it would suffice to
show that inspection in the general geographical area appeared rea-
sonable given the circumstances - perhaps the mere passage of
time, the kinds of housing structures in the area, or the general con-
dition of most housing in the neighborhood. Similarly, a warrant to
employ closed circuit TV monitoring upon the public streets might
properly issue. However, a much more substantial showing of need
than that in the Camara situation should be required. At a mini-
mum, police should be obligated to demonstrate the following: The
neighborhood is a high crime area and most residents support the
monitoring; the fact of monitoring will be posted and the monitoring
158. See Surveillance Technology: Joint Hearings, supra note 5, at 58; In-Home
Banking Due Here, supra note 30.
159. See supra note 38.
160. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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will be subject to administrative regulation; finally, no recordings
will be made. The aim of the monitoring here, it should be empha-
sized, should not be to gain incriminating evidence against a partic-
ular individual. Rather, it should be to deter the commission of
crime.'
61
Other Telecommunications Networks
Increasingly, non-commercial radio and television networking,
employing microwave and light wave, will supplement the tradi-
tional telephone one-to-one communication. Not only will individu-
als themselves be in 2-way citizens band radio nets, but in 2-way TV
cable and closed circuit nets as well. In addition, teleconferenc-
ing-group interaction employing the range of video, audio, docu-
ment, and data modes-will be employed.'6 2
Radio wave interception has not proven difficult, either in low
citizens band, or in ultra high frequency microwave radio transmis-
sion. 63 Channeling the modes along light waves, via fiber optic
cables, however, may prove more of a challenge.16 4 In any event, gov-
ernment interception, even with participant "permission," should
call for judicial warrant. Where the ease of interception is such that
law enforcement might flout judicial restraint, efforts should be
made to establish administrative restraints as to purpose and extent,
along with a periodic reporting requirement.
Visual Enhancement Devices
Employment of the telescopic lens, the miniature camera, and
the starlightscope, in order to view individuals on the public streets,
is probably difficult to reign in. Moreover, the practice does not
seem as threatening to the community as does centralized closed-
circuit TV monitoring. Yet absent warrant, such devices at least
should not be used to peer into the primary sanctuaries of home or
office. One should not be required to close one's curtains and move
into the basement, in order to be free of uncontrolled peering by
electronic or mechanical means. 16 5
161. See supra note 37.
162. See supra notes 34 and 35.
163. See supra notes 63 and 64.
164. See supra note 65.
165. Compare United States v. Kim 415 F.Supp. 1252 (D. Hawaii 1976); People
v. Ciochon, 23 Ill. App. 3d 363, 319 N.E.2d 332 (1974); Commonwealth v. Hernley,
216 Pa. Super 177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970).
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Government Purchase of Mailing Lists and Profiling
An IRS purchase of computerized mailing lists containing the
names and addresses of millions of American, together with their
estimated incomes, raises serious liberty concerns. Once again, the
notion of "assumption of risk" is misconceived. The agency's actions
should be understood as a grand fishing expedition through the pri-
vate and commercial affairs of countless citizens, the overwhelming
number of whom are law-abiding. The process takes "essentially
anonymous data in the commercial world and turns it into individu-
ally identifiable information, using it in a way the individual never
imagined. ' ' 16 6 As a result, many persons may decline mail-order so-
licitations, out of fear that somehow by participating in them, the
information will be fed into a computer and later used against them.
Not just the commercial mail-order business may be adversely af-
fected; charitable organizations that solicit by mail and groups en-
gaged in mail surveys also will face potential harm as a result of this
practice. More importantly, society will be the loser because of the
environment of fear and suspicion that is engendered.
No one can fault the IRS for seeking to catch tax-dodgers and to
recover the estimated three billion dollars that annually goes un-
paid. 117 Doubtless, the federal agency will garner millions of dollars
for the U.S. Treasury using mailing lists. In the long run, however,
the uneasy truce between the IRS and John Q. American will have
been further eroded. Problems in citizen resistance to paying taxes
are better solved by reexamining the fairness of tax policy than by
loosing a computerized spy system upon the citizenry. Accordingly,
one should not be deemed to have assumed the risk that bits and
pieces of information - whether gleaned from telephone directory,
census tract, cable system, or commercial lists - will be collated to
form an incriminating portrait. Only where government has an inde-
pendent basis"6 8 for focusing upon a given person as a suspect is it
justified in investigating him further; and then, only upon notice to
that person, and with an opportunity to challenge the government
action. Nor should Census Bureau data, accumulated for statistical
166. I.R.S. Starts Hunt for Tax Evaders, Using Mail-Order Concerns' Lists,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1983, at 1, col. 2 and at 23, col. 6 (quoting Alexander Hoffman,
chairman of the Direct Marketing Association).
167. Id. (I.R.S. estimate for the tax year 1981).
168. An independent basis might be suspicions arising from materials furnished
to the government by the individual himself or by his employer; or sworn evidence by
a third party upon personal knowledge.
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purposes, be turned over to the IRS to be used in developing an
individual's profile.' 9
In this age of the computer, we must draw lines .with great care
in order to prevent such extensive intrusions by government into a
citizen's private activities. The fourth amendment guarantees, not to
mention those of the first amendment, demand no less.
CONCLUSION
We have considered the substantial threats posed by government
monitoring. (A future article must deal with the grave dangers
threatened by private sector monitoring.) We find ourselves in an
information and telecommunications revolution that is changing our
world. Computer networking, the unification of telecommunications,
central data banking, profiling, and tracking present new challenges
for our constitutional system. Increasingly, in our evolving culture, a
person enters the public setting to conduct his personal life.
Fourth amendment doctrine must come to grips with this new
reality. In the main we have urged judicial intervention, as the basic
mechanism for establishing limits and controls.
The author does not minimize the difficulties involved in such an
approach. In the past, only rare applications for electronic surveil-
lance have been denied by harried magistrates. 70 Arguably, knowl-
edge of the judicial requirement at least has had a restraining effect
on police use of monitoring. In any event, the percentage of judicial
denials is unlikely to increase so long as the proceeding is ex parte.
Serious thought must be given to developing a mechanism for inde-
pendent agency challenges to surveillance applications.' 7' Adminis-
trative regulations, moreover, should supplement the warrant re-
quirement. These would be an important contribution to meaningful
control, as Professor Amsterdam"' points out.
Naturally, legislative oversight is critical in reigning in govern-
ment monitoring. Given the constantly changing state of the art,
there must be periodic legislative investigations of the developing
technology and practice, commission studies (like those of the Na-
169. Plan Would Give Census, IRS Data, supra note 43.
170. See supra note 56.
171. Morris Abram proposes an independent agency outside the prosecutor's of-
fice to oppose every application. H. SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at "Foreword," 4.
172. Amsterdam, supra note 81, at 416-429.
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tional Wiretap Commission) 173 and auditing, under legislative aus-
pices, of investigative agencies. Only then can Congress and the
states develop meaningful legislative controls.
Social need cannot be denied in our 1984. Government's obliga-
tion is to assure citizen safety and welfare; yet, its duty, as well, is to
safeguard liberty from government. To do so, government must es-
tablish constitutional and other legal restrictions upon its own con-
duct. Madison, in Federalist No. 51, said, "In framing a Govern-
ment, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the
government to controul the governed; and in the next place, oblige it
to controul itself. '17 4 As citizens, that is our task.
173. See Commission Studies, supra note 7.
174. J. MADISON, FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961) (Emphasis
added).
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